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Introduction
As metropolitan planning and policy challenges have grown more complex, and as governing models have shifted from compartmentalised, hierarchical structures towards more flexible, cooperative arrangements, scholars and others in urban planning and transportation have recognised the emergence of a new paradigm based on collaboration and inter-sectoral cooperation (Fainstein, 2000; Bertolini et al., 2008) . Collaboration and policy integration have become official tenets of European Union strategy, as they have elsewhere (European Commission, 2005; McGuire, 2006; Department for Transport, 2004) . Despite official rhetoric, however, meaningful collaboration and coordination around spatial and transportation planning often remain slow to develop (e.g., Naess et al., 2011) .
In the need for better metropolitan-wide policy collaboration, Portugal proves no exception. Literature on the Portuguese planning system tells a narrative of metropolitan fragmentation. Competition between municipalities (Pereira & Nunes da Silva, 2008; Oliveira, 2009 ), weak regional government (Nanetti et al., 2004) , and inconsistencies across sectors and among levels of government (Balsas, 2007; Carter & Nunes da Silva, 2001) impair effective metropolitan planning. The solution, according to many authors, rests in better inter-municipal and intersectoral coordination. However, useful suggestions remain scarce. The general transport policy literature, for example, has focused on the "barriers" to coordination (e.g. May et al., 2006; Stead & Meijers, 2009 ). While recognising barriers helps delineate the problem, we ultimately need pathways around these barriers.
At the same time, the institutionalist literature has documented a general increase in intergovernmental collaboration (Pierre, 2000; Rhodes, 1997 )a worldwide trend also surfacing in Portugal (Florentino, 2007; Silva & Syrett, 2006) . Seeking to understand the emergence of intermunicipal cooperation in particular, Feiock (2007) and Andersen and Pierre (2010) propose a theoretical model that helps explain why local governments might work together. Nonetheless, this basic model needs evidence to validate and refine it (Feiock, 2007) and to understand its applicability to the particularly challenging task of metropolitan development planning. This paper aims to help understand why and how inter-municipal collaboration around metropolitan land use and mobility planning sometimes emerges. We seek to identify factors that apparently contribute to or hinder voluntary collaboration. The approach departs from previous accounts of Portuguese government, which tend to consider only high-level decisions (e.g., Nanetti et al., 2004; Rosa Pires, 2005; Silva & Syrett, 2006; Carter & Nunes da Silva, 2001) . Instead, by attempting to understand institutional behaviour at the ground level, through interviews with practitioners, we test the applicability of existing theory (Feiock, 2007; Andersen & Pierre, 2010) to a specific context: urban land use and mobility planning. Furthermore, by introducing an institutionalist perspective to transportation planning, we aim to advance the debate around relevant policy integration in the transport sector.
Our research begins from the premise that many contemporary metropolitan policy and planning contexts face challenges for which inter-organisational collaboration, despite its costs and downsides, appears necessary to achieve better policies. Accepting this premise, we seek to understand what conditions might encourage collaboration's emergence.
The following section draws from existing literature to present a theoretical framework of intermunicipal collaboration. We then provide an overview of the empirical context, describe our case study approach, analyse the cases in light of the theory, and, finally, present policy implications and directions for further research.
Conceptual Framework
The examination of inter-municipal collaboration in metropolitan policy fits within a broader institutionalist inquiry, empirical and normative, into the evolving structure of governing institutions. Since at least the 1990s, a general conceptual and practical shift has emerged, away from a "classical," territory-based, hierarchical structure (i.e., "government") and towards more fluid, de-territorialised, network-based, multi-actor structures (i.e., "governance") (Korthals Altes & Taşan-Kok, 2010; Pierre, 2000; Rhodes, 1996) . In the governance arrangement, flexible entitiese.g., public-private partnerships, inter-municipal associations, non-governmental organisationsemerge to operate outside of the traditional government framework. Although some evidence suggests that some European contexts have begun a shift back towards a focus on government (Wollmann, 2010) , urban management in Portugal, as in many other places, has increasingly moved towards a governance model (Silva & Syrett, 2006) .
The attention to multi-actor, network-based governance has inspired explanations of how a particular forminter-municipal cooperationemerges. Feiock's (2007) institutional collective action model represents the decision to cooperate largely as a rational choice that compares transaction costs with expected benefits; in this sense the model can be viewed as firmly rooted in the work of Coase (1960) . Andersen and Pierre (2010) extend from Feiock's model, tempering the focus on transaction costs and rational choice, by introducing the importance of issues related to the nature of the task at hand and actor networks configurations. Geerlings & Stead (2003) and Stead & Meijers (2009) define the concepts of communication, cooperation, coordination, and integration as policy-forming activities along a continuum of increasing interaction, producing progressively more integrated outcomes ( Figure 1 ). In comparison with these terms, "collaboration" typically refers to the processof working together towards an intersection of common goals. Collaboration places a greater emphasis on process-related, behavioural aspects (e.g. Gray, 1989; Ring & van de Ven, 1994; McGuire, 2006) . Henceforth, "collaboration" signifies this process of working together, whereas communication, cooperation, coordination, and integration describe forms of collaborative activities aimed towards specific, non-procedural, outcomes. 
Terminology

Collaboration in Land Use and Transportation Planning
Mirroring a more general shift in public management (e.g., McGuire, 2006) , the move towards more integrated policy has become essential in the current planning paradigm. The urban planning profession has spent recent decades institutionalising collaborative approaches, in terms of public participation and stakeholder involvement (e.g., Healey, 1996; Fainstein, 2000) . Transportation planning has also moved in this direction, with increasing emphasis on collaboration, integration, and exchange with stakeholders (Bertolini et al., 2008; Meyer & Miller, 2001) .
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Does greater collaboration improve decision-making in metropolitan urban and mobility planning? The sector fulfils Gray's (1989) criteria for potentially benefitting from collaboration: wide range of stakeholders and actors, complex and uncertain environment, and history of failure using existing approaches. Chisholm (1992) suggests that voluntary collaboration in transportation planning can be equally, if not more, effective than central control. Feiock (2007 Feiock ( , 2009 ) argues that self-organising collective action is often effective in metropolitan governance. Case studies show how inter-organisational collaboration can yield better public transport service (Cascetta & Pagliara, 2008) , more coordinated transport policy (Hull, 2008) , and improved metropolitan planning capability (Weir et al., 2009 ).
On the other hand, collaboration has costs and limitations, as it can require time and effort, reduce accountability and transparency, and lead to co-optation and exploitation of power asymmetries (Feiock, 2009; Andersen & Pierre, 2010) . It may also lead to the predominance of a single organisational model, as collaborating organisations begin imitating one another (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) . When collaboration becomes a goal in itself it may undermine performance. Even where desirable, collaboration is usually insufficient for better policy outcomes, especially with regional problems requiring an integrated approach (Feiock, 2009) . Little evidence exists to confirm that collaboration produces better outcomes (Ansell & Gash, 2008) , in part due to the lack of a counter-factual or the difficulty in comparing outcomes and influences across contexts. Existing research also does not adequately reveal under what conditions or for what types of problems collaboration improves outcomes. Nonetheless, since metropolitan land use and transportation planning and policymaking almost always take place in multi-organisation and multi-jurisdictional settings, some form of collaboration seems necessary. What makes it emerge?
Theory on the Emergence of Inter-municipal Collaboration
Several studies have attempted to understand the factors and conditions which foster the formation of collaborative relationships between organisations (e.g., Bryson et al., 2006; Gulati,1995; Korthals Altes & Taşan-Kok, 2010; Ling, 2002; McCaffrey et al., 1995; Oliver, 1990) and specifically between municipalities (Andersen & Pierre, 2010; Feiock, 2007 Feiock, , 2009 ). This section elaborates on these factors.
Expected benefits and costs
Organisations will more likely attempt collaboration if the expected rewards (benefits) outweigh the costs (McCaffrey et al., 1995; Bryson et al., 2006; Feiock, 2007) . Incentives to collaborate depend on the nature of the problem at hand and can come from the external context or from the inherent benefits of collaboration itself. Expected benefits include, for instance, capitalising on potential scale economies, avoiding negative spillovers, strengthening legitimacy, and increasing the likelihood of achieving objectives.
Regarding costs, collaboration requires time and effort, i.e., transaction costs (McCaffrey et al., 1995) . The difficulty of managing collaborative relationships can introduce significant risk as well: the other partner may back out of the arrangement or otherwise fail to uphold their part of the agreement. Research suggests that, in most cases, costs will prevent collaborative arrangements, absent alternative means for achieving goals (Ansell & Gash, 2008) .
The legal and regulatory environment constrains organisations' decisions to collaborate and, in part, determines the incentives and disincentives and the nature of relations (Andersen & Pierre, 2010; Feiock, 2007; Korthals Altes & Taşan-Kok, 2010) . Laws sometimes mandate collaboration, while other times regulations may encourage or discourage it, intentionally or not. The rigidity of planning procedures can sometimes stifle collaborative innovation (Wassenhoven, 2008) . The effects of the legal environment on collaborative processes may be moderated if organisations have the ability to influence the regulatory framework.
Existing networks
Organisations already embedded in governance networksthe set of relevant actors and their working relationshipswill more likely collaborate (Gulati, 1995 (Gulati, , 1999 Ebers, 1999; Bryson et al., 2006; Feiock, 2007) . The number of inter-organisational connections and the strength and quality of those connections are key factors in the emergence of collaborative partnerships (Gulati, 1995) . Prior positive interactions will also increase the likelihood of sustaining a partnership by providing the opportunity to judge others' trustworthiness, recognise opportunities for cooperation, and manage risks (Bryson et al., 2006; Feiock, 2007) . At a regional scale, however, with numerous municipalities, links between a subset of municipalities can be a hindrance as they form an asset that governments may not want to abandon for the regional good (Kantor, 2006) . Bryson et al. (2006) suggest that collaboration also requires some sort of "linking mechanism" or external "trigger." This trigger may be an outside event that prompts potential partners to reevaluate their situation and consider collaboration, or it may be a third-party broker with sufficient power and connections to bring stakeholders together and introduce the idea of collaboration (Gray, 1989) .
External Trigger
Organisational characteristics
Size, hierarchical structure, and institutional norms (Ebers, 1999; Bryson et al., 2006) , as well as leadership capability and style (McCaffrey et al., 1995) , can also influence collaboration decisions. Staff members' initial disposition towards collaboration is a crucial but often overlooked factor (Gray, 1989; McCaffrey et al., 1995) . Decision-makers with a higher tolerance for risk or more willing to experiment with new approaches may be more likely to try collaboration, even when benefits appear uncertain (Andersen & Pierre, 2010) .
Geographical context
For inter-municipal collaboration, geography shapes opportunities for collaborative projects and relations between potential partners. Neighbouring municipalities with greater shared concerns will be more likely to collaborate. As asymmetrical power relationships can hinder collaboration (McCaffrey et al., 1995) , municipalities in the position of dominant central city often face particular barriers (Feiock, 2007; Andersen & Pierre, 2010) . 6
The Portuguese Planning Context
Land use and mobility planning in Portugal is characterised by both formality and fragmentation. The 1976 Constitution establishes a framework for three levels of sub-national government: regional, municipal, and civil parish (i.e., freguesias, in practice having limited authority in the land use and transportation sectors). Although the national government has over time created different regional government structures, little devolution of power has actually occurred. A national referendum in 1998 rejected the creation of regionally elected administrations (Syrett and Silva, 2001) . So, the country has two levels of elected government, central and municipal, with a patchwork of regional and metropolitan entities primarily dependent on either the central government or the municipalities for administrative and financial support (Oliveira, 2009 ).
Land use planning responsibility falls principally to the national and municipal governments, through the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning and city halls (Câmaras Municipais), respectively. At the regional scale, deconcentrated branches of the central government, the Regional Coordination and Development Commissions (CCDR) hold responsibility for preparing regional development plans and coordinating various planning activities and services. The CCDRs also correspond geographically with the EU's Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) and administer EU Structural and Cohesion Funds. Although engaged in regional coordination, CCDR's activities do not constitute true metropolitan planning because, first, their territory greatly exceeds that of the functional metropolitan areas and, second, the central government directly controls them.
National legislationincluding laws in 1991, 2003, and 2008establishes the legal framework for Metropolitan Areas. Separate legislation (Assembleia da República, 2008) exists for the nation's two largest metropolitan areas, the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon (AML) and the Metropolitan Area of Porto (AMP), legally defined as consisting of 18 and 16 municipal governments, respectively ( Figure 2 ). Prevailing law grants these metropolitan areas the authority to "participate" in, "promote," and "coordinate" various planning and investment activities of metropolitan scale. 1 Nonetheless, the law also subjugates the authority and financing of the metropolitan areas to the constituent municipalities and the central government, thus they lack the political and financial authority to effectively tackle metropolitan governance challenges (Oliveira, 2009) . Municipalities remain reluctant to relinquish decision-making or financial authority (Silva & Syrett, 2006; Oliveira, 2009; Nelson, 2008) and the central government continues to make the majority of strategic and horizontal metropolitan decisions (Breda-Vázquez & Oliveira, 2008). The Portuguese spatial planning system is characterised by a high degree of formal rationality, as established by the 1998 Territorial Planning and Urban Development Base Act that defines a hierarchy of land use plans from the national to municipal level. At the municipal level, city hall prepares, implements, and enforces the Municipal Master Plan (Plano Director Municipal, PDM), regulating land development. Portuguese law specifies the content of the PDM and the procedure for its preparation, implementation, and revision.
In transportation, the national Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications plays a major planning role, with the Ministry of Finance and Public Administration having financial oversight functions. The national Institute of Mobility and Land Transport (IMTT) regulates provision of transport services and, among other activities, helps fund municipality engagement in planning and public transport systems analysis. A 2003 law first enabled metropolitan transportation authorities for Porto and Lisbon, but these were never implemented. A 2009 law specified attributes for Metropolitan Transportation Authorities (Autoridades Metropolitanas de Transportes, AMT) for the AMP and AML, including the development of metropolitan mobility plans (Assembleia da República, 2009). However, the level of funding available for these authorities and their ultimate effectiveness remain unclear to date; as of this writing, the AMTs are not functioning. In contrast to spatial planning, no standardised procedures govern mobility planning in Portugal. Municipalities thus have a high degree of discretion in mobility planning, resulting in a range of approaches and outcomes.
Consistent with the EU's quasi-federalism, European policies also shape municipal and metropolitan planning (e.g., Korthals Altes & Taşan-Kok, 2010). One of many EU initiatives influencing planning in Portugal, the INTERREG program has notably impacted inter-municipal cooperation, as revealed in the cases below. Originally conceived to help overcome national borders as barriers to EU development, INTERREG promotes cross-border, transnational, and interregional collaboration and is financed via the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) under the objective of European Territorial Cooperation (European Commission, 2008) . Complex and evolving with multiple sub-programs under different objectives, INTERREG finances various forms of collaborative partnerships for specific development projects on issues such as mobility, tourism, urban services, and business development.
Breda-Vázquez and Oliveira (2008) identify two key constraints on inter-municipal cooperation for territorial strategic planning in Portugal: the centralised and bureaucratic nature of the national government and its vertical (sectoral) power. They also identify important additional relevant attributes of Portuguese societyi.e., the role of informal relationships (among family, neighbors, friends)and political systemi.e., the role of local political leadership. The two integrated (i.e., inter-sectoral) territorial development strategies that Breda-Vázquez and Oliveira (2008) analyse, while having different specific origins and histories, both come out of national government programs, which subsequently hampered their ability to achieve the intended results. In contrast, the cases below represent municipally driven collaborative initiatives, ultimately more limited in sectoral scope than those examined by Breda-Vázquez and Oliveira (2008) .
Methodology
To understand how inter-municipal collaboration emerges in Portugal, we employ a case study methoduseful when asking "how" or "why" questions, regarding "contemporary" phenomena over which investigators have little control (Yin, 2003; p. 9) . Case studies can be used to generalise to theoretical propositions in situations with unclear "boundaries between phenomenon and context" and "many more variables of interest than data points" (Yin, 2003; p. 13) . Thus, case studies enable the systematic investigation of complex phenomena in specific context, with the goal, in this particular research, of generalising to theoryhere, the theory of the emergence of inter-municipal collaboration.
We select cases in which a municipality had an interest in collaborating with at least one other municipality on land use or mobility planning issues. To answer the question of why intermunicipal collaboration sometimes occurs and sometimes fails, we analyse two types of cases: where collaboration emerged or where desired collaboration did not occur. Our outcome of interest is the formation of a collaborative working relationship, i.e., the process, independent of project outcomes. The partnership (the collaborative relationship between two or more municipalities) or the lack thereof (the potential partners) is the unit of analysis. For comparability, we limit cases to the AML and AMP and to the period between the mid-1990s and 2009. As the two largest (demographically) metropolitan areas, Lisbon and Porto likely face the greatest challenges in metropolitan planning; however, they may not be fully representative of all urban areas in Portugal.
We interviewed 31 individuals (primarily technical-level urban planners and transportation engineers) representing 21 different organisations including central government agencies, city councils, transport operators, and municipal development entities. The interviews were semistructured, focusing on understanding: the organisation's role in the planning process; internal organisational characteristics; specific projects undertaken, particularly those involving collaboration; and, any other interactions with external organisations. Interviews were digitally recorded and later transcribed. This information was complemented by publicly available documents and materials obtained from the organisations. Table 1 summarises the nine cases of inter-municipal collaboration examined in the AML and AMP: the Metro Transportes do Sul, the SATU transit system, four projects under the EU's INTERREG Program, an inter-municipality mobility plan for the South Bank, and the Cascais and Lisbon municipalities. EU funding e Notes: a. Yes signifies the formation of a collaborative working relationship to undertake a project; b. Some cases involved other partners in addition to municipalities; c. original project scope also included Barreiro and Moita; d. Barreiro's municipal-owned transport company; e. Lisbon was originally involved in the EU INTERREG, but pulled out; n.a. means not applicable.
The Cases
Metro Transportes do Sul (MTS)
In 1994, four Lisbon area municipalities -Barreiro, Moita, Seixal and Almada (Figure 2 )came together to propose a 100km light rail project, eventually called Metro Transportes do Sul (MTS) (Nelson, 2008) . Historically, geography has constrained most development to north of the Tagus River, compelling the relatively small south bank municipalities to compete for economic growth, a situation in which collective action would improve their competitive position. In 1994, public protests over rising bridge tolls provided the impetus to trigger a collective transit proposal. Collaboration on the MTS allowed the partners to take advantage of potential scale economies offered by a larger transit network and increased the likelihood of earning financial support from the central government. Indeed, the government soon assumed financial and legal responsibility for the MTS, but, ultimately, after protracted negotiation, scaled the project down to only the first phase (Nelson, 2008) . With the Moita-Barreiro link postponed, only Seixal and Almada remained actively engaged in the project. Despite eventual political backlash over high costs, the project went forward. As the central government increased control over the project, the collaborative activities between Almada and Seixal shifted to other aspects, such as the design of public spaces around the rail line, which might have otherwise been left aside.
For the municipalities involved, collaboration appeared to be a winning prospect. The municipalities could expect relatively short-term, tangible results-construction of the transit system-that would bring real mobility and political benefits, with the central government and others assuming most of the financial cost and risk.
SATU Transit Line
Partly in response to growing traffic congestion, the municipality of Oeiras, west of Lisbon, has coordinated with Sintra on a public transit project. The proposed system would link population and employment centres in Oeiras with a highly populated part of Sintra. In contrast to the MTS case, the central government declined to support the project, so Oeiras established a publicprivate partnership, Sistema Automático de Transporte Urbano (SATU), to oversee planning and construction and negotiated a planning coordination agreement with Sintra. While the majority of the project would serve Oeiras, the link with Sintra was expected to contribute a significant ridership share, thus being crucial to financial feasibility. Currently, only the first phase of SATU is operating, approximately 1-km entirely within Oeiras municipality.
SATU itself is controversial, drawing some community opposition, and involves important costs for Oeiras, as shareholder in the public private partnership. Nonetheless, the partners clearly consider the benefits of the inter-municipal collaboration to outweigh costs (note, it is not clear whether Sintra will be expected to financially support the extension). The availability of private investment helped provide the external financial support needed to make the project feasible. If successful, the project would produce visible outcomes and associated political payoffs. While SATU faces financial and political risks, it currently involves low transaction costs and few compromises: collaborative activities entailed relatively modest coordination, namely defining a route and reserving the appropriate land. The relationship was facilitated by the fact that some of the planners involved were already acquainted, having been former classmates.
INTERREG Program Cases
While designed primarily to encourage international collaboration, the INTERREG program has also brought together municipalities and other organisations within countries. All INTERREG projects include collaborationestablishment of a collaborative relationship, designation of a lead partner, and adoption of a formal agreement for managing the partnership are prerequisites for project approval. These cases are still instructive, for two reasons. First, all municipalities were able to apply for INTERREG funding but only some did. Second, some INTERREG projects led to further collaboration, while others did not. Why did INTERREG have a greater impact on some municipalities than others? We examine four cases in which INTERREG funded inter-municipal collaboration around mobility projects. 2
FLEXIS (Serviços Flexíveis para o Sul da Europa)
Loures worked with Odivelas and Barreiro 3 (see Figure 2 ) to arrange for commuter parking and car-pooling at large shopping centres and provide connections to transit. Since each of the three municipalities faced similar challenges with commuting, the purpose of collaboration was to share knowledge on strategies for commuter parking services, not to directly coordinate transit operations.
E-mobility (Novos Sistemas e Serviços Informativos para a Mobilidade no Sul da Europa)
Loures and Odivelas collaborated with an existing internet site that aggregates transport information in the Lisbon area to aid users' trip planning. The municipalities worked together with the internet site to provide coordinated data on parking availability, transit services, and road networks.
TRAMO (Transporte Responsável, Acções de Mobilidade e Ordenamento)
Barreiro, Loures, and Moita joined together 4 to create a best practice manual for mobility planning. Barreiro hoped the manual would eventually help develop its mobility strategy and set a precedent for mobility planning replicable by other municipalitiesthus setting it apart as a leader. After the official project ended, Barreiro and Moita continued to work jointly on an intermunicipal mobility plan (treated as a separate case here). The TRAMO project also encouraged Loures to later pursue mobility planning with its neighbour Odivelas.
Estrada da Circunvalação
The neighbouring municipalities of Porto and Matosinhos (Figure 2 ) collaborated to redesign the road that runs along their common border, the Estrada da Circunvalação. Recognising the opportunity to capitalise on EU funds, the AMP helped catalyse the project by initially bringing the two sides together in conversation.
In the first three Lisbon area cases, collaboration arose from INTERREG-created conditions: providing financial incentives that increased the expected benefits of collaborating; introducing potential partners, thus creating inter-organisational links; reducing management risks and difficulties by requiring, and assisting with, formal contracts; legitimising collaboration (via EU backing) among otherwise possibly sceptical political leaders. In addition, these three cases involved relatively low-level collaboration, mainly sharing information and project management activities that did not require substantial sacrifices. Still, the program did require administrative coordination, enough to provide meaningful collaborative experience. In the final INTERREG case, although the Estrada da Circunvalação had been a long-standing issue for both sides, it took a third party broker and EU financial incentives to trigger collaboration.
Inter-Municipality Mobility Plan for the South Bank
Aiming to attract economic development through a more coordinated mobility system, several municipalities south of the Tagus River have joined in preparation of an inter-municipal mobility plan (IMMP). The process was spurred in part by the central government's decision to construct a new bridge between Lisbon and Barreiro (Figure 2) , expected to bring new growth to the South Bank. Barreiro originally intended to prepare its own mobility plan, but after the IMTT made collaboration with other municipalities a condition of financial support for the plan's preparation, Barreiro enlisted five neighbours. Experience in TRAMO made collaboration with Moita relatively easy. Four others -Seixal, Sesimbra, Palmela, Setúbal, not incidentally governed by the same political coalitionagreed to join.
All partners hoped an inter-municipal approach would bring coherence to a complicated transport system and help the South Bank compete economically against Lisbon. In addition, Barreiro's and Moita's previous INTERREG experience established (or strengthened) existing networks, which may also have been influenced by shared political coalition affiliations. Finally, certain characteristics specific to Barreiro, including unusually proactive leadership in mobility and adjacency to the planned bridge, may have increased its likelihood to collaborate.
Cascais
Like many municipalities, Cascais has been pursuing plans to improve public transport. Rather than leave decisions to private operators and the national rail company, the municipality intended to take a more proactive role. With internal funding, Cascais' planners began in 2008 to study alternative transit systems and ownership structures. This led them to recognise the scale benefits and increased chances of securing central government supportof working with other municipalities. Nonetheless, they still consider collaboration too difficult and, instead of initiating it themselves, hope that the newly formed Metropolitan Transport Authority will act as a convener. At present, Cascais has not yet received national government or regional support for its public transport planning.
Why has Cascais been less successful in developing collaboration? One explanation is geographic; sharing only two populated borders, Cascais has fewer needs for physical connections with other municipalities. Still, it views neighbouring connections as important and even has existing professional ties with Oeiras. The lack of collaboration can be explained by weak mutual incentives (Cascais would benefit, but its neighbours less so), the absence of an external convener or triggering event, and limited collaborative experiences.
Lisbon
Lisbon municipality represents another case of little historical collaboration, despite many potential benefits. Planners in Lisbon acknowledge the need for and potential benefit of coordination with neighbouring municipalities, such as around parking provision at suburban train stations to reduce inbound automobile traffic. Lisbon initially participated in INTERREG projects FLEXIS and e-MOBILITY, but, for undisclosed reasons, ended its involvement before the projects' completion. Recognition of expected benefits and the promise of EU funding were not sufficient to compel Lisbon to sustain the collaboration. Lisbon completed an INTERREG project with Genoa and Valencia, but no other Portuguese municipalities were involved. Nor has Lisbon's INTERREG experience led to further collaboration, as it has for other municipalities.
To our knowledge, Lisbon has not formed any inter-municipal land use or transportation collaborations. Why not?
Several factors complicate collaboration for Lisbon. First, the municipality's central status and role as the national capital inevitably create a power imbalance vis-à-vis potential partners. Second, the size and complexity of the Lisbon city hall apparently inhibit collaboration. For example, planners in other municipalities expressed interest in working with Lisbon, but did not know whom within the large planning department to contact. Furthermore, Lisbon's city hall undergoes a mandated reorganisation every ten years, often disrupting existing interorganisational connections. For instance, planners in Odivelas met with Lisbon planners for an INTERREG project, but two years later they could not contact the same individuals. Lisbon's large and complex bureaucracy also hampers the city's planners' abilities to initiate collaboration, as they face a more cumbersome process of gaining formal approval from the municipal leadership. Also, as Portugal's largest municipality, Lisbon has its "own" planning challenges; its planners may consider it more worthwhile to focus on problems under their direct control rather than problems requiring collaboration with others.
Theoretical Synthesis
The cases illustrate how various factors and conditions lead to, or fail to lead to, collaboration in the Portuguese context. The cases do not represent the overall state of planning in Portugal, nor do they reveal generalisable conclusions about the probability of specific factors leading to collaboration. They do, however, shed light on the validity of the theoretical model of collaboration, as outlined in Section 2.3, for the Portuguese context.
Validation of existing models
The cases largely support existing models of inter-municipal cooperation, as summarised below.
Expected Benefits and Costs
The cost-benefit calculus is critical; however, in the land use-transport sector, potential efficiencies or scale economies from the project alone are rarely sufficient to motivate collaboration without external incentives.
All municipalities in both the AMP and AML face at least some mobility challenges that could be more efficiently addressed through joint solutions, but collaboration has emerged only in the presence of external financial and political incentives. In such cases, actors chose to collaborate because they expected the benefits, often potential economies of scale and political currency, to outweigh the costsusually time, effort, and risk. However, additional incentives were necessary: almost all projects received funding from higher government agencies; the exception, SATU, relied on private financing. That is, expected benefits are usually insufficient to overcome transaction costs, as predicted by previous research (e.g., Ansell & Gash, 2008) . Even external incentives are usually insufficient. For instance, funding from INTERREG and IMTT was available to all municipalities, but not all took advantage of it.
Existing Networks
Existing organisational and personal ties are critical to establishing a collaborative partnership. However, such relationships can sometimes be built by outside actors.
Where collaboration emerged, potential partners relied on existing inter-organisational networks or specific instruments designed to induce such networks; in one case (MTS), an exogenous force (protests over the toll hikes) was large enough to overcome the apparent lack of existing networks. As suggested by the case of IMMP, a shared political party can facilitate intermunicipal relationships.
Where collaboration failed to develop, the lack of prior connections appears partially to blame. In Lisbon, frequent organisational restructuring prevented the establishment of interorganisational links, inhibiting collaboration. Similarly, few previously established relationships with other municipalities hampered Cascais' efforts to initiate a conversation around public transit.
Organisational Characteristics
Strong political leadership is an important factor in the formation of collaborations, but it is not necessary if other conditions are supportive.
Political leadership can sometimes produce collaboration, but existing models are correct not to overemphasise its importance. Especially in the MTS, SATU, and IMMP cases, strong political leadership was critical. However, leadership was not always a deciding factor; some projectse.g., under INTERREGwere driven by ground-level technical staff. Exceptional leadership appears to be one way to overcome environmental barriers to collaboration, but its absence can be overcome with other supportive conditions.
Geographical Context
Unless assuming a leadership role, a municipality in the position of metropolitan hub must often overcome greater barriers to collaboration due to asymmetrical power relationships with neighbours and special organisational characteristics.
Anderson and Pierre (2010; 229) suggest that a "regional hub" municipality can play a "host" role in collaborations, but otherwise tends to face barriers to collaboration. In our cases, Lisbon's position as the central city hindered collaboration by creating power imbalances. In addition, the size and complexity of the Lisbon city hall hindered collaboration by making personal connections difficult and imposing greater bureaucratic obstacles for staff interested in initiating collaborative relationships.
Refinement and extension of existing models
The Portuguese cases also reveal insights not previously emphasised in inter-municipal collaboration models, especially those specific to the land use and transport sectors. We summarise these findings in the following propositions, as extensions and refinements to the conceptual model, though they require investigation in other political/cultural contexts.
Nature of the problem
Transport investment problems facilitate inter-municipal collaboration more readily than land use planning problems.
In the decision to collaborate, the nature of the problem at hand determines the balance of expected costs and benefits (Andersen & Pierre, 2010; Feiock, 2007) . Specific to the transportland use context, the cases suggest that problems involving transport investment offer more compelling incentives for three reasons. First, most major transport initiatives in metropolitan areas (such as the MTS and SATU) require cross-municipal work, with each municipality recognising the potential gain, in order to have a meaningful local impact. Second, compared with land use problems, infrastructure and mobility projects generally offer more "win-win" opportunities, as costs can typically be shared among partners, with net shared benefits. Furthermore, mobility projects' payoffsparticularly infrastructure projectstend to be shortterm and tangible, which, as Feiock (2007) points out, offer greater political benefits, thus more likely spurring collaboration. As an example, the MTS project required strong coordination because the system's effectiveness required an inter-municipal scale. Although financial constraints ultimately reduced the scale of the project to two municipalities, these remaining partners still had strong impetus to collaboratethe tangible outcome, a new light rail project, implied relatively little financial sacrifice.
In contrast, regional land use planning problems are rarely solved by voluntary collaboration because these problems typically require trade-offs from at least one partner and usually provide only long-term, less tangible benefits. In the Portuguese context, cooperation around land use usually requires setting aside competition for development (and the associated property tax revenues). Although we set out in this study to examine collaboration in both land use and transportation, the identified cases primarily feature transportation. This does not mean that collaboration around land use has not occurred, but suggests that inter-municipal cooperation around transport infrastructure and services may be easier. This finding should not surpriseland use is inherently a "local" issue. Even in stereotypically "collaborative" settings like the Netherlands, local land use controls have been recognised as an impediment to more effective regional cooperation (Kantor, 2006) .
Legal and Institutional Environment
Collaboration will more likely emerge in contexts with flexible legal and institutional structures, at least when collaboration is not already mandated by these structures.
While previous models acknowledge the influence of institutional context (Andersen & Pierre, 2010; Feiock, 2007; McCaffrey et al., 1995) , in Portugal legal structures have been critical. The cases illustrate how flexibility and ambiguity in the legal environment give municipalities leeway to pursue collaboration, whereas, as Wasserhoven (2008) finds, rigidity in regulation appears to prevent collaboration. All the collaborations studied emerged in contexts where the legal and institutional structures were flexible or altogether absent, providing space for actors to tailor solutionswith other partiesto the particular problem. In some cases, such as under INTERREG, policy deliberately created the conditions for collaboration outside the formal planning framework. For the MTS transit project, the collaboration process produced a formal arrangement, as Portuguese law governing the formation of public-private partnerships largely allows parties to create a suitable situation-specific arrangement.
As discussed, collaboration in Portugal appears to have been more forthcoming around mobility planning, with its ambiguous regulations, than for land use planning, with its rigidly defined processes. Municipalities engaging in mobility planning have particular autonomy, as Portuguese regulations neither define nor require municipal-level mobility planning. In IMMP, south bank municipalities took advantage of this ambiguity to establish their own mobility planning process. In contrast, the closely regulated land use planning system leaves less flexibility, which may partly explain the little evidence found of inter-municipal collaboration in land use planning.
External Trigger
Intervention by a third party often plays a deciding role in the emergence of collaboration by changing the cost-benefit calculation, initiating organisational and personal ties, reducing management risk, and legitimising collaboration.
Portuguese government and EU policies often shifted the cost-benefit calculus, usually deliberately, by providing financial incentives, connecting potential partners, reducing coordination risks, and legitimising collaboration. Higher levels of government enabledwithout mandatingcollaboration.
In all cases, an external event or third party intervention was a necessary, but not sufficient, spark. In most cases, the catalyst came from policies initiated by a higher-level government, especially those offering financial incentives that could change the benefit-cost calculus. The INTERREG program performed a number of catalysing functions: in addition to financial support, it connected potential partners, reduced management risk, and legitimatised collaboration. This last function may be particularly important in Portugal, where organisational culture tends towards avoiding uncertainty and needing rules (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005) . External events, such as the announcement of plans for the new bridge in the IMMP, also shaped expected benefits and prompted potential partners to consider new projects.
More generally, the role of an external trigger illustrates the importance of combined top-down and bottom-up action. INTERREG and the IMTT encouraged inter-municipal cooperation through top-down incentives that built on local willingness to collaborate. The MTS was borne of local advocacy around an external threat, followed by a municipal coalition; central government intervention, apparently indispensable for financial reasons, coincided with a reduced scale and scope of collaboration (fewer municipalities stayed actively involved and those remaining played a reduced role). With the IMMP, the central government played a critical role in using financing to consolidate a nascent coalition. Only with SATU did the central government not play an important role in supporting and legitimising bottom-up action; in this case, the private partner may have played this role.
The Inter-municipal Cooperation Model
Figure 3 depicts the model that emerges. The nature of the problem, combined with societal and geographical context, structures the balance of benefits and costs. When expected benefits are strong, tangible, certain, and relatively short-termas in transit infrastructurethe emergence of collaboration requires relatively modest additional factors, which may include existing networks, an enabling legal environment, supportive organisational characteristics, and an external trigger. When benefits are weak or uncertainas in long-term planningseveral strongly supporting conditions are necessary. In the latter case, at least in Portugal, the necessary combination of supporting factors is unlikely to occur unless orchestrated by an outside force, usually a higher level of government. We find no single factor as necessary and sufficientevidenced by Lisbon's discontinued participation in INTERREG.
Not surprisingly, the cases evidence "causal heterogeneity" (e.g., Ragin, 1999) different combinations of different strength factors lead to inter-municipal collaboration in Portugal. We believe the framework derived from Feiock (2007) and Andersen and Pierre (2010) is complete; but it is not predictive, per se. 
Policy Implications
Two important conclusions emerge regarding implications for the Portuguese planning context.
First, metropolitan-level collaboration around transportation and land use will likely require intervention by higher levels of government that can incentivise action. The current Portuguese system places municipalities in a competitive state, unlikely to voluntarily cede the political and financial power gained through local population and economic growth. However widespread the existing instances of collaboration, they have so far addressed only issues of limited scope. For the reasons discussed, collaboration has emerged primarily around transportation projects and only in the presence of external incentives or a third-party catalyst. The larger and more complex task of planning and coordinating development at a metropolitan level requires more than voluntary action, needing coordination of many actions by many parties. Numerous commentators in Portugal have argued that only a stronger regional government can produce sufficiently consistent metropolitan-level policies. However, repeated attempts to legislate metropolitan authorities to manage land use and transport in Portugal have yet to effectively materialize; since the effectiveness of a metropolitan authority depends so heavily on the support of municipalities, further attempts will likely make no more than modest near-term gains (Nanetti et al., 2004; Oliveira, 2009 However, our analysis shows that municipalities are often willing to collaborate given the right incentives and regulatory conditions. This suggests that, instead of a regional authority, a metropolitan association with voluntary but heavily incentivised membership, benefitting from funds allocated by the central government, could substantially influence metropolitan planning. A metropolitan association with access to potential funding sources could finance projects prescribed in a metropolitan plan, thus transforming the zero-sum context of metropolitan planning into a win-win situation, in which voluntary collaboration emerges.
Second, inter-municipal collaboration in Portugal will more likely be led by the mobility sector than the land use planning sector; however, advances in one could potentially leverage progress in the other. Building on the observation that mobility initiatives facilitate collaboration more readily than land use plans, funding for transport projects could be used to lead coordination in land use planning. An approach that also helps strengthen existing stakeholder networks and leaves space for flexibility in formulating plans seems promising. If the Metropolitan Transport Authorities created in 2009 actually come to be, their effectiveness may be enhanced by adopting such a coordination-via-incentives role.
Conclusions and Directions for Further Research
Those involved in planning in Portugal widely agree that uncoordinated plans and policies pose a major urban challenge (Silva & Syrett, 2006; Carter & Nunes da Silva, 2001; Oliveira, 2009) . In contrast to most research on Portuguese planning and the wider literature on policy integration (Stead & Meijers, 2009; May et al., 2006) , which tends to focus on describing barriers, this article aimed to understand the forces that lead to greater collaboration. Using case studies based on interviews of planning practitioners, we attempted to validate a model of inter-municipal collaborationderived from Feiock (2007) and Andersen and Pierre (2010) . The analysis suggests several points of validation and additional propositions that extend and refine the model. In summary, collaboration is facilitated by positive incentives, flexibility in the institutional system, the presence of an external catalyst, existing networks, and specific organisational characteristics. Importantly, the existence of any one of these factors is not enough; usually nearly all must be present for collaboration to occur. Furthermore, existing collaborative relationships in Portugal have tackled only problems of relatively limited scope. The Portuguese planning system may be more likely to achieve metropolitan coordination through a voluntary metropolitan association that can incentivise collaborative projects.
The emergence of collaboration depends on context: the factors identified as facilitating collaboration will be influenced by the larger cultural and political milieu, which may also influence each factor's relative importance. Therefore, we cannot necessarily generalise the findings from the Lisbon and Porto metropolitan areas to other Portuguese metropolises or other countries. However, the broader research on collaboration suggests that some dynamics of collaboration formation are common to most, if not all, contexts. On points for which the Portuguese cases validate the prevailing model of inter-municipal collaboration, the analysis appears to support the hypothesis that these findings, at least, are generalisable to other contexts. More comparative research could help delineate between context-specific and general mechanisms of collaboration formation.
Directions for Future Research
While the cases studied help identify forces leading to collaboration, only a larger, more systematic analysis would provide a more complete picture of inter-municipal collaboration in the Portuguese system. More detailed case studies could attempt to quantify the incentives and disincentives involved in the decision to collaborate, thereby improving specific policy insights. Comparative studies with other contexts would help draw more generalisable conclusions about collaboration, although such studies would need to effectively control for cultural and political differences.
As governance in many countries grows more complex and networked, the need for critical analysis of collaboration and the network approach to governance will only increase. This is particularly important as more governments adopt the view that "collaboration is good" and enter into collaborative relationships merely for the sake of adopting "good practice." As government increasingly becomes governance, detailed research in specific contexts will be needed to find the right balance between formality and flexibility.
Finally, our analysis only attempts to assess what makes inter-municipal collaboration emerge. We have not answered the question: does such collaboration lead to "better" projects? While not a straightforward undertaking, aiming to gauge the "success" of collaboration will ultimately reveal its true value.
